Abstract. It is proved that there is a saddle point over the relaxed controls, and so over the strategies defined on the relaxed controls, for differential games in which the trajectory variable appears linearly in the dynamical equation and payoff. This is a strong saddle point property, but the example of Berkovitz [1] , of a game that does not have a saddle point in pure strategies, does have a saddle point in this sense. Saddle points over the chattering controls are obtained for linear games in which the opposing control variables appear separated. The introduction of relaxed controls into differential games is analogous to the introduction by von Neumann of mixed strategies into two person, zero sum games.
1.1. Introduction. Motivated by work in the calculus of variations and control theory (see [63, [12, [13] and [14) , we introduce relaxed controls to study two person, zero sum differential games. For differential games which possess a certain linearity property in the trajectory variable (in the differential equation describing the game and in the payoff function), we prove there is a saddle point over the relaxed controls, and so over the strategies defined on the relaxed controls. As pointed out below this concept of a saddle point over the (relaxed) controls is a strong property because a player can use his saddle point control, and, independently of what the other player does, not loose in comparison with the saddle point payoff.
1.2. Outline. We first define a two person, zero sum differential game and describe the notions of strategy and saddle point. In 3 and 4 we introduce relaxed controls in a rigorous manner as elements of the dual of a Banach space of integrable vector-valued functions. The presentation follows Warga [13] . The relaxed controls are shown to be a compact convex set and we prove that the "piecewise constant" relaxed controls are dense.
The games considered have a payoff which, though bilinear, is only separately continuous on the product space of relaxed controls for the two players. However, a general theorem of Sion [103 then states there is a saddle point, so our principal result concerns the existence of a saddle point among the relaxed controls, for linear differential games. We observe that the well-known example of Berkovitz [1] (see also [3] ) of a differential game that does not have a saddle point in pure strategies does have a saddle point in our sense in the form of constant strategies on the relaxed controls.
Finally, for linear games in which the control variables appear separated, saddle points are obtained over the particularly simple relaxed controls known as chattering controls.
2. Differential games. The situation to be discussed is a two person, zero sum differential game described as follows.
Notation 2.1. We have a dynamical system (2.1) (t) f(t, x, u, v), where the trajectory x(t)e R', an initial position x(0)= (xl(0),-.., xm(O))= Xo is given, and the time belongs to some closed bounded interval of T of R--say T [0, 1]. There are two sets of control variables: {u} Y, a compact subset of Rp, and {v} Z, a compact subset of R q.
To ensure integrability of the differential equation we shall assume that the vector function
is continuous in t, x, u and v and satisfies a Lipschitz condition in x of the form" If(t, x, u, v) f (t, x', u, v)l W(t)lx x'l for X, X' e R (or at least for x, x' in some compact subset of R wherein all trajectories x(t) are known to lie), e T, u e Y and v Z. Here q(t) is an integrable real-valued function of and l. denotes the usual distance in Rm.
Together with the above dynamical system we have a payoff of the form:
Here / is a (not necessarily linear) real-valued function on the Banach space C([0, 1]) of curves in R over [0, 1] , and h is a continuous real-valued function on TxRmx YxZ. DEFINITION 2.2. A two player, zero sum differential game is a dynamical system described by differential equations of the above form, together with the compact sets Y and Z and the payoff P.
The first player chooses u e Y at each time e T in a measurable way, thus generating a function u(t), so that the final payoff P(u(t), v(t)) is as large as possible. At the same time the second player chooses v at each time e T so that P(u(t), v(t)) is as small as possible. Remark 2.3. Denote by U (resp. V) the set of measurable functions from T to Y (resp. Z).
A (pure) strategy for the first player would ideally be defined as some rule which, for each time e T, determines for him his choice of u(t) on the basis of what has happened in the game so far, that is, from the knowledge of x(r), u(r) and v(z) for 0 _<_ z < t. Similarly, there would be a notion of strategy for the second player.
On the grounds that a player knows his own previous choice of controls, Roxin [5] if (u*, v*) form a saddle point over the controls and if u* is played, then v must play to minimize P(u*, v). Hence v*(t) is an optimal controller subject to the maximum principle. Similarly, u*(t) is an optimal controller maximizing P(u, v*).
Also, note that any other saddle point (, 5) over the controls must give the same payoff, but nonsaddle plays might give the same value of P without satisfying the saddle point inequalities.
Background 2.8. We have already noted that there are difficulties surrounding the notion of a strategy for a player in a differential game. Friedman [3] circumvents these difficulties by considering "upper" and "lower" approximating games in which one player or the other has advance information. To obtain the convergence of the resulting "upper" and "lower" values of the game he requires in effect that the payoff P(u, v) be jointly continuous in both control functions. This he ensures by considering only dynamical systems of the form fl(t, x, u) + f:(t, x, ) and payoffs of the form
so that u and v are "separated."
Somewhat earlier (cf. [1] ), Berkovitz 
Y= {u'O<=u<= 1} and Z= {v'O<=v<_ 1}.
In terms of his "variational approach," Berkovitz shows this game has no solution in pure strategies.
A. Friedman also cites this example in [3] and shows that for this game his upper value V + 1/2 while his lower value V_ 0. Thus, as V + -V_, this game does not have a value in his theory.
We shall see below, however, that by introducing the idea of relaxed controls, this game, for example, does have a saddle point over the relaxed controls.
3. Relaxelt controls. The notion of relaxed, or generalized, curve was introduced into the calculus of variations by Young [14] , and applied to control theory by Warga [13] , McShane [6] and Young [15] . For further introduction of relaxed controls into differential games see the paper by Smoljakov [11] . The method and content of Smoljakov's paper, however, is quite different from the treatment below. In the discussion of relaxed controls described below we shall follow the setting described by Warga [13] .
Suppose we have a dynamical system and payoff as described in Notation 2. In preparation for our discussion of differential games let us return to our discussion of dynamical systems with two sets of control variables as described in Notation 2. We are now in a position to prove our final result.
THEOREM 4.1. Consider the differential game with dynamics and payoff given by equations of the above form (4.1) and (4.2). Then there is a pair of relaxed controls a*(., t), z*(., t) which give a saddle point for the game when each player can play over his set of all relaxed controls. That is, if a(., t) (resp. z(. t)) is any other relaxed control for the first (resp. second) player, P(a*, z) >__ P(er*, z*) >__ P(cr, z*). Proof. Since the system equations are linear in x, it follows that for fixed z in 5z(Z) the mapping a p(x(. )) from 5z(Y) to the real numbers is continuous and linear on 5(), where 5z(Y) is a subset of B]', endowed with the weak star topology. Similarly, for fixed a in (Y) the mapping z #(x(. )) from 5(Z) to the real numbers is continuous and linear. Hence for fixed z in 5(Z) the mapping a ---, P(, z) is continuous and linear on 5(Y). Similarly for fixed a in 5(Y) the mapping z P(a, z) is continuous and linear on (Z).
Since 5(Y) and (Z) are convex and compact, the existence of a saddle point follows from the general theorem of M. Sion [10] . The In fact, Smoljakov [11] proves by variational methods that a saddle point is obtained over the relaxed controls in the Berkovitz game if u (trying to maximize the payoff) "plays" a constant probability measure a* (mass 1/2 at 0 and mass 1/2 at 1) throughout the time interval, while v plays the constant control v(t)-1 / 2 throughout the interval.
5. Chattering control saddle points. In this section we examine several special cases of Theorem 4.1; in particular, we consider when the saddle point (a*, z*) over the relaxed controls can be reduced to a saddle point over classical controls or, perhaps, chattering controls (see Definition 3.4) of a specified degree. Proof. Let (a*(t), z*(t)) be the saddle point over the relaxed controls obtained by Similarly we determine v*(t) such that C(v*(t),
6(v*(t), t) F(v, t) It is clear that u*(t) has the same "effect" on the game as the relaxed control a*(t), and similarly v*(t) has the same effect as z*(t). Hence it follows easily that P(u*, v) >= P(u*, v*) >= P(u, v*) for any other pair of control functions u(t), v(t). 
where B'(t), C'(t), F'(t), G'(t) are each matrix-valued. 
